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Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost
Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs
Richard C. Hoyt, Dale C. Dahl,
and Stuart D. Gibson*
Courts have struggled for many years with estimating eco-
nomic damages in antitrust cases. The objectives of this Article
are to:
(1) outline the evolution of the principal methods that the
courts have used to measure damages to antitrust plain-
tiffs;
(2) examine how courts have limited the applicability of
the existing damage theories; and
(3) propose extensions and consolidation of existing damage
rules and methods of proof.
I. EXISTING DAMAGE THEORIES
Courts have emphasized three basic methods for computing
damages suffered by antitrust plaintiffs. Two of these methods
have been used for many years to measure damages in tort and
contract cases, the oldest of which is the "before and after" ap-
proach." To deal with the inadequacies of that theory, courts
have applied the "yardstick" approach, which itself suffers from
certain limitations. And recently, courts have accepted a third
approach, the "market share" theory; but this, too, has its draw-
backs.
A. BEFORE AND AFTER APPROACH
The "before and after" approach compares a plaintiff's profit
situation in two distinct time periods, and uses his own business
and its performance to make the calculations of lost profits.
Generally, the plaintiff's profit position prior to the impact of the
* Dr. Richard C. Hoyt is President of Analytics, Incorporated, an
economic consulting firm in Excelsior, Minnesota; Dr. Dale C. Dahl is a
Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics and Adjunct Professor
of Law at the University of Minnesota; Stuart D. Gibson is a graduate of
the University of Minnesota Law School and member of the Minnesota
bar.
1. See 1 T. SEDGWIcK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
§§ 182, 183 (8th ed. 1891).
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antitrust violation is compared with his position during the im-
pact.2  There are, however, three possible variations to this
approach, based on the time spans for which given sets of data
are available.
First, profits (or sales) during the period of the impact may
be compared with the same data for the period immediately fol-
lowing the impact. Judge Friendly outlined this approach in
Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.: 3
Although, because of defendant's long domination of the mar-
ket, plaintiff could not show how sales and profits once realized
in a free market had diminished, no reason is seen why it could
not have proceeded in the opposite direction, by showing how
its sales and profits had waxed as United's unlawful practices
had waned.4
Neither of the other two variations has been formally
adopted by a court,5 but they are both logical outgrowths of the
basic approach. First, profits earned prior to the period of
impact of the antitrust violation and profits earned after the
period of impact may, by interpolation, be used to calculate the
profits that a plaintiff would have earned during the impact
period absent the violation. Second, profits earned between the
periods of impact of two distinct antitrust violations may be
extrapolated to calculate the profits that a plaintiff would have
earned absent the violations during the two distinct impact
periods.6
Prior to Central Coal and Coke Co. v. Hartman,7 most courts
took the position that profits earned by a business were so depen-
dent on numerous and uncertain contingencies that they could
not be proved with any reasonable degree of certainty.8 Thus,
profits were not recoverable as damages. The court in Hartman,
however, stated that
proof of the expenses and of the income of the business for a
reasonable time anterior to and during the interruption charged,
or of facts of equivalent import, is indispensable to a lawfuljudgment for damages for the loss of the . .. profits of an
established business.9
Because the rule laid down in Hartman requires a plaintiff's
2. See generally, Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble
Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 497 (1972).
3. 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1962).
4. Id. at 910.
5. See Parker, supra note 2, at 505-506.
6. Id.
7. 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901).
8. Id. at 98.
9. Id. at 99.
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business to be operating prior to the violation, it necessarily ex-
cludes calculation of profits from a new business, and profits to
be earned in the future by a business. The language "facts of
equivalent import," however, seems sufficiently open-ended to in-
clude at least some of the variations to the theory.10
The United States Supreme Court in two subsequent cases
relaxed the plaintiff's burden of proof under the before and
after theory, but these developments did little to overcome the
inherent drawbacks of the approach itself. In Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Co.," the Court made it clear that since
the defendant's wrongful conduct had made ascertainment of
plaintiff's damages difficult, the defendant could not complain
that the damage calculation was imprecise. Moreover, the Court
permitted the plaintiff to calculate net profits by subtracting
an estimated expense of doing business from an established pat-
tern of gross profits. This meant that antitrust plaintiffs no
longer had to prove their actual cost of doing business in order
to recover damages. 12
In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,' 3
the Court upheld the jury's finding that the measure of damages
was the difference between what the plaintiff actually realized
and what he would have received from sales at reasonable prices
except for the unlawful acts of the defendant.' 4 The effect was
that a plaintiff no longer had to prove the actual price at which
the product would have sold, but could base his damages calcula-
tion on a reasonable price for the product. 15
Despite the Supreme Court's relaxation of the before and after
theory to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof on the issue of lost
profits, use of the theory is strictly limited. First, the plaintiff's
business must be one that is established and operating prior to
the impact of the conspiracy to restrain trade. Thus, the theory
is unavailable to a plaintiff who is prevented from entering a
market because of the defendant's actions.' 6 Second, in order
10. See text accompanying notes 3-7 supra.
11. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
12. The court in Hartman required the plaintiff to prove his actual
cost of doing business. 111 F. at 99-103.
13. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
14. Id. at 566-68.
15. The court in Hartman also required the plaintiff to prove the
actual price at which his product would have sold. 111 F. at 99-103.
16. "He who is prevented from embarking in a new business can
recover no profits, because there are no provable data of past business
from which the fact that anticipated profits would have been realized
can be legally deduced." Id. at 99.
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to compare earning before and after the violation, not only must
earnings have existed before the violation, but those earnings
must have been reasonably uniform over time. Otherwise, a
court applying the theory would not know which earnings to use
for the "before" period, and the damage calculations would be
too speculative.17
B. YARDSTICK THEORY
The second theory for proving lost profits in antitrust cases
is the "yardstick" theory. While the before and after theory
compares profit data for the plaintiff's business over two or more
time periods, the yardstick theory compares the plaintiff's sales
or profits during the period of impact of the antitrust violation
to those of a similar company that was not adversely affected by
the defendant's anticompetitive practices. The first attempt to
use the yardstick theory was made in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, Inc.' 8 In addition to showing lost profits under the before
and after theory, the plaintiff introduced evidence comparing the
earnings of his theater with those of a competing theater that
had benefited from the defendant's actions. 19 The evidence
established that the net receipts of the competitor for the period
of impact exceeded the plaintiff's net receipts by $116,000. The
plaintiff's showing under the before and after theory was that
its receipts fell off by $125,000 during the same period. The
Supreme Court did not find the two theories mutually exclusive.
Affirming a verdict for the plaintiff based on the before and after
theory,20 the Court stated that it did "not imply that the verdict
could not be supported on some other theory."'2 1
Following the decision in Bigelow, courts adopted and de-
veloped the yardstick theory in a number of other cases. In
17. This limiting condition is implicit in Judge Sanborn's insistence
in Hartman that calculation of lost profits be free of speculation, be
based upon documentary evidence of an established business, and upon
his approving quotation of a Minnesota supreme court case: "'The value
of such a business depends mainly on the ordinary profits derived from
it. Such value cannot be ascertained without showing what the usual
profits are.'" Id., quoting Goebel v. Hough, 26 Minn. 252, 258, 2 N.W.
847, 849 (1879).
18. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
19. Courts have since realized that it is improper to use such a
firm as a yardstick. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
20. The jury found that the plaintiff suffered damages of $120,000.
327 U.S. at 254.
21. Id. at 266.
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William Goldman Theaters v. Loew's, Inc.,22 the trial court
arrived at an estimate of damages by attributing the earnings of
one of the defendant's nearby theaters to the plaintiff's theater
and then subjectively adjusting that amount to account for the
differences between the two theaters. In addition to considering
the average gross income of the various theaters, the court ad-
mitted and considered evidence of the average profits of the
theaters in question, although it stated that such evidence was
not controlling.23
Later courts modified the Goldman approach by refining the
factor by which the two or more businesses are to be compared,
making the damage computation more certain and thus easier to
prove. In Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc. 24 the court
focused on "net gross receipts," calculated by subtracting film
rental costs from gross receipts. 25 In that case, the defendant's
conduct limited the plaintiff to showing second-run movies.
Despite the apparent loss of revenue from this change of status,
the court recognized that a second-run theater would suffer no
economic loss if the reduction in its gross receipts caused by the
antitrust violation was less than the reduction in its film rental
costs. And, reasoning that a second-run theater might have
lower advertising costs than a first-run theater, the court in
Milwaukee Towne Corp. v. Loew's, Inc.2 6 calculated net gross
receipts by subtracting advertising costs of each theater, as well
as film cost, from gross receipts.
Although most of the cases in which the yardstick theory
has been applied involved the motion picture industry, the same
approach may be applicable in other areas. There are, however,
four serious limitations to the use of this theory in other than the
motion picture industry. First, the plaintiff's firm and the yard-
stick firm must be engaged in the same line of business. The
law as applied in the theater cases, especially in Homewood,27
suggests a very strict adherence to this criterion. But, while the
two businesses must be in the same line of commerce, they need
not be identical. The court in Loew's, Inc. v. Cinema Amuse-
ments, Inc.28 stated that the differences between the base theater
22. 69 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), affd, 164 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
23. Id. at 108.
24. 110 F. Supp. 398 (D. Minn. 1952).
25. "Gross receipts" refers to gross box office receipts. Id. at 415.
26. 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
27. 110 F. Supp. 398 (D. Minn. 1952).
28. 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
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and the plaintiff's theater went to the weight to be accorded the
evidence and not to the admissibility of the evidence.
Second, not only must the two firms be engaged in the same
business, but the yardstick firm must be operating within a mar-
ket structure and under cost and demand conditions similar to
those that the plaintiff would have faced absent the violation.
This means that the yardstick theory cannot be used success-
fully if there is a wide disparity in the sizes of the firms in a
market or if there is widespread product differentiation in the
market, since these facts would be reflected in disparate cost
and demand characteristics of the plaintiff and any potential
yardstick firm. This limitation is illustrated by the refusal of
the court to grant damages to the plaintiff in Fargo Glass and
Paint Co. v. Globe American Corp.29 In that case, the plaintiff
was a wholesaler of gas ranges (in addition to other home
appliances). Defendant Globe, a manufacturer of gas ranges,
entered into a contract to sell its entire output to defendant
Maytag, another wholesaler. The plaintiff claimed that the
arrangement between Globe and Maytag violated the antitrust
laws and tried to prove damages by comparing its profits with
the profits of Maytag. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that it could not award damages to the plaintiff when
there was no evidence that the plaintiff would have sold as
much as Maytag, or that it would have realized the same profit.
In addition, there was no evidence in the record as to the plain-
tiff's and Maytag's comparative costs of doing business.
Third, the yardstick firm should also occupy a market posi-
tion similar to the position the plaintiff would have held absent
the violation. 30 If the plaintiff is among the dominant firms in
the market, the yardstick firm must also be in that position.
Similarly, if the plaintiff is a smaller, less dominant firm, so
must the yardstick be. Even if the yardstick firm meets all the
other criteria, the variance in profits attributable to market
position 3 1 suggests that an accurate damage calculation may not
be possible absent a market position similar to that of the
plaintiff.
Fourth, the defendant's firm can seldom be used as the
yardstick firm. In addition to the problems recognized in Fargo
29. 201 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953).
30. Parker, supra note 2, at 511.
31. See Weiss, Quantitative Studies of Industrial Organization, in 1
FROTrRs OF QUANTITATIVE EcoNomics (M. Intriligator ed. 1971).
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Paint,3 2 the basic flaw in the use of the defendant's business as
a yardstick during the period of the impact of the antitrust
violation is that
[i]t seems obvious that if the conspiracy benefited the defend-
ant's business, such business does not represent profits made in
a free and open market. The teaching of Victor Talking Ma-
chine Co. v. Kemeny [271 F. 810 (3rd Cir. 1921) ] is that in
measuring damages it is improper to use as a base business re-
sulting from a violation. If any such evidence were permitted,
it would have the effect of giving to the plaintiff the fruits of
the conspiracy and then the resulting judgment would treble
such a verdict. Where the defendant business is the only avail-
able "yardstick," before such evidence is admitted there should
be deducted an appropriate amount for any increase resulting
from the violation.33
Thus, the yardstick theory, while useful in some situations,
is of limited applicability in many others because to make the
theory reliable, the above conditions must be met relating to firm
size, market structure, and market position.34
C. MARKET SHARE THEORY
The market share theory is the newest of the existing lost
profits theories. This approach involves a comparison of rela-
tive changes in market shares of the plaintiff and the defendant.
Damages are computed by translating the plaintiff's lost market
share into a dollar volume of goods that he would have sold,
which is then multiplied by the plaintiff's historical profit
margin.
The first courts to use this theory developed it as an out-
growth of the before and after and the yardstick approaches. Al-
though courts and plaintiffs often dealt with damages in the
context of the existing theories, their actual application more
closely resembled the market share theory. In Richfield Oil
32. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
33. E. TImBERLAE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
21.12 at 332 (1965).
34. Another factor limiting the availability of the yardstick theory
to antitrust plaintiffs is that if both the before and after theory and
the yardstick theory apply, courts have generally tended to prefer the
former. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Theatre Inv. Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 650
(W.D. Wash. 1947). The rationale for preferring the before and after
theory seems to be that if a plaintiff has evidence of the actual loss he
suffered, he should not be allowed to rely on more speculative evidence
as to the profits he would have realized by comparing his business to a
similar business.
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Corp. v. Karseal Corp.,35 the plaintiff tried to use the yardstick
theory to show lost profits by comparing the sales of its firm
with the sales of a base firm, the sales of which were tradition-
ally one-third to one-seventh those of the plaintiff. In addition,
the plaintiff showed that it was staffed, equipped, and able to
produce a sufficient amount of its product to meet the additional
sales. The plaintiff also introduced evidence showing its net
profit per case of its product. The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, without elaborating, ruled that the jury was entitled to
infer from such evidence that in the absence of the defendant's
illegal conduct, the plaintiff would have sold three times as
much of its product as the base firm did during the same period.
Citing Story Parchment,36 the court compared the uncertainty
of the damage computation in that case to the uncertainty of
a damage computation in a personal injury case: "There are
many cases in which damages are allowed the element of uncer-
tainty is at least equal to that in the present case-as, for exam-
ple, copyright and trade mark cases, cases of unfair competi-
tion, and many cases of personal injury .... ,,37 The next
major case in which this theory was applied was Rangen, Inc.
v. Sterling Nelson & Sons.38 There, a contractor was accused
of obtaining certain contracts by bribing a state official. The
evidence established that four firms had bid on the contracts
in question and that the plaintiff and the other three firms
had bid with approximately equal success on similar contracts
in the past. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals computed
the plaintiff's damages by calculating gross revenue from the
business of one-fourth of the contracts and then multiplying that
amount by the plaintiff's historical profit margin.
A similar calculation was made by the court-appointed
master in the case of Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp.39 The
master computed the plaintiff's lost sales by multiplying the
sales for the total market by the plaintiff's estimated share of
the market absent the defendant's illegal activity and then by
the plaintiff's profit margin. The plaintiff's profit rate was
considered by the master to be between its actual rate for the
impact period and the higher rate the plaintiff claimed it would
have received absent the defendant's illegal action.
35. 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960).
36. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
37. 271 F.2d at 715 (1931) (emphasis added).
38. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
39. 429 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
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Subsequent to Rangen, a variation on the market share the-
ory of proving damages was approved by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc. 40
In that case, the plaintiff, Reserve Plan, sold dance lessons, some
of which were franchised by defendant Arthur Murray, Inc.
Arthur Murray withdrew its franchise when the plaintiff refused
to accept its financing plan. After finding the defendant in vio-
lation of the antitrust laws, the court appointed a special master
to compute damages caused by the loss of the Arthur Murray
franchise. The master first calculated from the evidence in the
plaintiff's records that one-half of the plaintiff's business was
attributable to the defendant. He then multiplied the plaintiff's
total annual income by one-half, reflecting the fact that half of
the plaintiff's business consisted of Arthur Murray accounts.
Finally, the master subtracted from that figure the expenses
attributable to the Arthur Murray portion of plaintiff's business
(one-half of total expenses).
The United States Supreme Court first approved the market
share theory in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 41
Zenith, sued by Hazeltine for patent infringement, counter-
claimed under the antitrust laws, alleging that it was unlawfully
excluded from competing with the plaintiff in Canada. 42  The
trial court awarded damages to Zenith, reasoning that Zenith
had introduced evidence that indicated that but for the defend-
ant's illegal conduct it would have achieved sixteen percent of
the Canadian television market at the outset of and throughout
the damage period.43  The court computed the award by sub-
40. 406 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1969).
41. 401 U.S. 321, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971). Justice
White aptly described the Zenith litigation as "marathon." Id. at 323.
The trial court rendered its decision in 1965, 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1965). The court of appeals reversed, 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967), and
the Supreme Court in its turn reversed in part and affirmed in part, 395
U.S. 100 (1969). The court of appeals then reconsidered the matter,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court, 418
F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), but this decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 401 U.S. 321 (1971). See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
42. Defendant also counterclaimed that it had been unlawfully ex-
cluded from competing with plaintiff in England and Australia. The
trial court awarded Zenith damages based on its exclusion from these
markets. 239 F. Supp. at 77-78. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that Zenith made no showing that plaintiffs conduct excluded it
from the English and Australian markets. 388 F.2d at 36-37. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's holding on this issue. 395
U.S. at 125-129.
43. Zenith introduced evidence as to the similarity of the Canadian
and American television markets and that it had obtained between 15.6
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tracting from the sixteen percent figure the three percent share
of the Canadian television market actually obtained by Zenith.
A similar determination was made for the Canadian radio mar-
ket. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the award to Zenith, holding that the fact that Zenith was able
to show damages under the market share theory did not prove
that damages were in fact suffered.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and, on remand,
the Seventh Circuit stated that the measure of damages was the
"difference between percentage share that defendant actually
enjoyed during the damage period and the percentage it would
have had as a free competitor. 44 The court, citing Bigelow,
noted that Zenith's testimony as to the similarities between the
Canadian and American markets was competent evidence by
which the amount of damages could be reasonably approximated.
The court stated, however, that some of the damages awarded
by the trial court were based on actions of the plaintiff which
occurred prior to 1959, the earliest date for which damages could
be claimed under the four year statute of limitations and
remanded the case to the trial court for a recomputation of
Zenith's damages.
Zenith again appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed
the holding as to pre-1959 damages and set out certain standards
to be used in determining whether damages should be awarded
for lost future profits. The Court stated that losses occurring
in the future are unrecoverable if the fact of their accrual is
speculative or their amount and nature are unprovable. 45 Fur-
ther, it held that the refusal by a court to award future damages
on grounds that they are too speculative is equivalent to holding
that no cause of action has arisen as to those damages. If and
when they are suffered, they may then be sued upon within four
years after the date on which they were inflicted. The Court
thus reasoned that had Zenith sued for pre-1959 damages in 1954,
determined by the appeals court as the time at which the cause
of action on such damages had arisen, it would not have been
able to show future injury with such reasonable certainty as to
be awarded damages for the period of 1954-1959.46
percent and 21.7 percent of the American television market during the
impact period. 395 U.S. at 116.
44. 418 F.2d at 25.
45. 401 U.S. at 339.
46. One of the most recent cases to deal with the market share
theory is Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk A.G. [1975-1] Trade
1242 [Vol. 60:1233
ANTITRUST DAMAGES
Although the market share theory has recently achieved ac-
ceptance as a method for proving lost profits, it suffers from sev-
eral limitations. Extensive and complicated data are required to
compute the actual damages suffered, as well as to lend support
to the use of the theory at all. In order to make the calculations,
at least four types of information are required: (1) a clear defini-
tion of the relevant market; (2) historical sales data on that mar-
ket and on related markets; (3) economic history and trends of
the relevant market; and (4) evidence of the plaintiff's ability to
enter the relevant market.4 7 If all the data needed for the calcu-
lations are not available, the plaintiff will be forced to assert
many assumptions about the markets and firms involved. If
these assumptions are unsupported by evidence, recovery can be
precluded under the theory.48
II. FOREGONE PROFITS AND FUTURE DISCOUNTED
FUTURE PROFITS MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
Each of the three antitrust damage theories thus far accepted
by the courts can be applied to the limited circumstances for
which they were developed. No single framework, however, has
been developed that would be of use in calculating damages in
a greater array of situations. The foregone profits and dis-
counted future profits models proposed in this Article draw upon
the existing approaches, but incorporate several theoretical ex-
tensions which make them applicable in any of the three fol-
lowing fact situations: (1) where a plaintiff has lost an exist-
Cas. 66,216 (S.D. Tex., April 25, 1975). The court there not only re-jected the defendants' objections to the use of the market share theory,
but also placed the burden on the defendants to show the method's un-
reliability.
[D]efendants argue that Method II should be disregarded be-
cause it is premised upon a "market share analysis", as opposed
to one of the two more conventional approaches known as the
"before-and-after" method or the "yardstick" method. Al-
though these latter methods are more widely accepted ....
they are not the exclusive methods in proving damages ....
Defendants have failed to demonstrate that a market share
analysis is inherently unreliable in proving damages. Accord-
ingly, this Court will not hold that an antitrust plaintiff must
be bound by convention in proving losses resulting from anti-
trust violations.
Id. at 66,220.
47. See Gibbons, The "Market Share" Theory of Damages in Pri-
vate Enforcement Cases, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 743 (1973).
48. See, e.g., Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1962).
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ing market share;49 (2) where a plaintiff has been prevented
from growing in a market as a result of a defendant's illegal
acts;5 0 and (3) where a plaintiff has been foreclosed from enter-
ing a market.51
The foregone profits and future discounted profits models
allow measurement of impact in these three situations by uti-
lizing time-observed firm entry, exit, and growth patterns. It is
the incorporation of these dynamic concepts in the models that
distinguishes them from the existing damage theories. As will
be evident in subsequent discussion, the foregone profits models
assume adequate and favorable response to three crucial eco-
nomic questions: (1) what is the "rightful share" that the plain-
tiff would enjoy had it not been for the wrongful acts of the
defendant; (2) what pattern of market entry and firm growth
is appropriate to the situation under investigation; and (3) what
definition and level of profit should be employed in estimating
losses due to the antitrust violation.
B. THE FOREGONE PROFITS MODEL
1. Loss of Existing Market Share
The application of the foregone profits model to the first
situation, a plaintiff's loss of an existing market share, is pre-
sented in Figure 1.52 The point T1 shows the date that the plain-
tiff entered the market under consideration. The distance from
the horizontal line to point E indicates the actual market pene-
tration. The line E - F denotes the increasing rate of market
share that resulted until time period T2. Line F - G indicates the
market share from the time that penetration was complete until
the defendant's illegal practices began. The line G - D indicates
the actual market share level that would have been sustained
after market stabilization until the present time. (This level is as-
sumed to be constant.) Thus, the distance from F to the horizon-
tal axis represents the market share that was obtained and that
49. E.g., Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Corp., 431 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); Arthur Murray,
Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 506 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1969).
50. E.g., Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
51. E.g., P.D. Hays v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 420 F.2d 836 (9th
Cir. 1969).
52. For ease and simplicity of presentation, Figures I, II, and III
reflect linear relationships. Depending on the fact situation, however,
curvilinear functions may be more appropriate.
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reasonably could have been maintained by the plaintiff had it
had full legal access to the market in question.
FIGURE I
FOREGONE PROFITS MODEL, LOST SHARE CASE
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T, T2 T3 Time T4
The line G - B indicates the plaintiff's actual loss of market
share over the period of the impact of the violation (from Ts to
T4). The vertical distance from the horizontal axis to any point
on the line G - B represents the actual market share achieved.
The percentage of market share represented by area GBD indi-
cates the market share lost by the plaintiff. Foregone profits
are estimated by multiplying the plaintiff's ordinary level of
profit times sales and the foregone market percentages, repre-
sented by the triangle GBD.
The ability to ascertain full legal access to a particular mar-
ket is tied to the economic theory that market conduct and
performance will be influenced by the structure of the market.
The question of what evolutionary patterns of concentration
develop depends on the type of industry. New industries are
p
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generally populated by a fairly large number of relatively small
firms; however, as the industry matures, concentration increases.
A single firm may gain a dominant market share, then yield to
a few rivals so that three, four, or five firms emerge as an
oligopolistic core supplying the majority of the industry output.53
In another pattern of evolution, the level of concentration
reached in the early maturity of the industry does not lessen
as the industry matures. Where the dominant firm controls
substantially all of the output from the very beginning, the
evolutionary pattern follows generally two courses: the domi-
nant firm increases and continues to dominate, or concentration
decreases as a single firm monopoly gives way to a highly
structured oligopoly.54 Not all industries follow these patterns
of evolution and concentration, and, as a result, numerous sub-
patterns of changes in concentration can be identified. 55 For
example, there is some empirical support for the belief that a
firm's growth rate is independent of its size. This phenomenon
is known as the law of proportionate effect, which generates a
log normal distribution 6 of firm size where one or two firms
are very large relative to the majority of firms in a given indus-
try. Much effort has been made verify the log normal distribu-
tion theory in describing size distribution of firms.57
Regardless of the evolutionary pattern, stable industries
exhibit slow changes in seller concentration over time. While
the proportion of the market supplied by the largest four to
eight firms tends to be quite stable, the rank of relative market
shares of these firms may shift.56 This shifting of relative mar-
53. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 161-63 (1967).
54. Id. at 162.
55. Id. at 163.
56. A log normal distribution is a highly skewed distribution where
one or two firms are very large relative to the majority of firms.
57. See Hart & Prais, The Analysis of Business Concentration, J.
ROYAL STATSTICS Soc'Y (1956); Hymer & Pashigian, Firm Size and Rate
of Growth, 70 J. POLITICAL ECON. 556 (1962); Ijiri & Simon, Business
Firm Growth and Size, 54 AM. EcoN. R.v. 77 (1964); Mansfield, Entry,
Gibrat's Law, Innovation, and the Growth of Firms, 52 AM. EcoN. REV.
1023 (1962); Silberman, On Lognormality as a Summary Measure of
Concentration, 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 807 (1967); Simon & Bonini, The Size
Distribution of Business Firms, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 607 (1958).
58. A study based on the 1947 and 1958 Census of Manufacture, for
example, shows that out of 204 selected industries, in only 38 were the
four largest firms the same in both 1947 and 1958. In 25 cases, the size
ranking of the "big four" had changed, and in 166 of the 204 industries,
one or more of the big four of 1947 had been replaced by 1958 by previ-
ously smaller firms. See Collins & Preston, The Size Structure of the
Largest Industrial Firms 1909-1958, 51 AM. EcoN. REv. 986 (1961).
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ket shares does not alter the mutual interdependence concept of
oligopolistic structures, nor does it qualify the significance of the
typical top level seller concentration. It does, however, stress
that there apparently is an ever continuing rivalry for market
share among the firms in an industry, even in those industries
that are distinctly oligopolistic. Furthermore, it indicates that
when applying the market share theory of damages, the re-
searcher must take into consideration the indigenous barriers to
entry that may cause changing market concentration.
Barriers to entry traditionally take one or more of several
forms: (1) special legal sanction in the form of governmental
regulations, patents, or tariff provisions; (2) absolute cost advan-
tages existing in the short run in the form of input control; (3)
managerial and technical know-how; (4) product differentiation;
(5) tying arrangements; or (6) other economies to scale or size.
Returning to Figure I, these barriers to entry should be reflected
by the level of point E, with movement from E to F representing
the ability of a particular firm to overcome the short-run indige-
nous barrier to entry. If a plaintiff attempts to prove damages
by comparing the market performance of his product with that
of a similar product, he must show that the actual entry and
growth in the related market is similar with regard to produc-
tion, marketing technique and firm capabilities. If market
penetration was not possible because of illegal activities, indus-
try experience of competitive but similar products should be
used while taking into consideration the type of industry and
its historical evolution. 59 Depending on the specific situation,
it is generally possible to make an accurate judgment regarding
entry, growth, and market potential. The share of a market
that a plaintiff obtains also obviously depends on how the rele-
vant product and geographic markets are defined, which is a
function of the particular liability issues involved.
A critical aspect of the foregone profits model is the profit
level that is used to estimate foregone profits. In most cases, the
appropriate profit norm should be net profits before taxes, either
as a percent of sales or on a per unit basis. Depending on the
situation, defendant and/or plaintiff profits can be used as a
norm. If defendant gross profits before taxes are to be used
and are available, but net profits are not, gross profits can be
multiplied by average industry conversion ratios between gross
59. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
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profits and net profits before taxes 0 to calculate the profit rate
to be used in the damage calculation. If defendant profits are
not available in summary form, sales, prices, and costs may be
used to arrive at net profits before taxes."' If costs are not
available, estimated profits and/or cost functions can be used.
In determining the appropriate profit level to use in esti-
mating damages, the plaintiff's average profits over a number
of years should be calculated. The problems generated by not
doing so are illustrated in Schwabe,6 2 where the plaintiff used
as a profit level the profits from just one year. The court re-
jected the profit rate as being abnormally high, given plaintiff's
historical profit performance. 63
It is further desirable, if economies to scale exist,64 to esti-
mate long run total costs and total revenue functions so as to
accurately account for the incremental profits stemming from
foregone market shares. Not only is this procedure more accu-
rate, but it also allows for a better understanding of any barriers
to entry deriving from this phenomenon. These total costs and
revenue functions should, however, be tested for their statisical
significance and relevance as they pertain to the industry and
the relevant geographic and product markets.
The primary thrust of the foregone profits model in the case
described in Figure I follows the before and after approach out-
lined in BigeZow. 5 The only difference between the two ap-
proaches is that the court in.Bigelow compared the plaintiff's
profits before and after the impact of the antitrust violation,
while the foregone profits model compares the plaintiff's market
share before and after the impact of the violation.66 Because of
60. These conversion ratio statistics are available from a variety of
public sources, FORTUNE magazine and MooDy's, for example, depending
on the nature of the industry. They can also be derived from private
data developed as a result of the lawsuit.
ACt
61. The formula is PPSt = (1 - - ), where PPSt = profits
Pt
as a percent of sales; Pt = price per unit; ACt = average cost per unit.
This function derives from the typical profit function where gross profits
equal revenues minus costs.
62. 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1962).
63. Id. at 911-912.
64. Economies to scale (or economies of mass production) imply a
downward-sloping long run average total cost curve. As plant size
increases, there is a concomitant decrease in cost of production per unit.
65. 327 U.S. 251 (1946). See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
66. As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court recently
recognized comparison of market shares as an acceptable means of
showing lost profits. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
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the relative market shares comparison, the foregone profits model
allows damages to be measured without specifically accounting
for external effects on the relevant market, such as inflation and
supply shortages, since the model assumes an equal impact by
such phenomena on all firms. This tends to eliminate conjecture
that losses might have been occasioned by a general decline in
the economy or by a decreasing demand for the relevant prod-
uct.0 7 f
In employing the concept of relative market shares in the
foregone profits model, one must also be aware of legitimate
economic forces that could cause a decline in the plaintiff's rela-
tive performance. Factors such as price competition, managerial
acumen, and nonprice competition, in the form of advertising and
product differentiation, can and generally do have an impact on
market shares. Therefore, before attributing all foregone profits
to illegal causes, those economic variables that could have a
similar impact must be identified and evaluated accordingly.
2. Preclusion of Market Share Potential and Foreclosure from
Market Entry
The application of the foregone profits model to the situa-
tions where the plaintiff is prevented from growing in markets
as he otherwise would have absent defendant's violation and
where the plaintiff is totally foreclosed from entering the market
are outlined in Figure II.
The point T1, by an extension of the line E - A to the hori-
zontal axis, shows the date of entry that the plaintiff did enter or
would have entered the market under consideration. The dis-
tance from the horizontal line to point A indicates the actual
penetration by the plaintiff, if the plaintiff was able to penetrate
the market in the face of the exclusionary practices of the defend-
ant. The distance to E indicates the penetration that would have
been realized but for the anticompetitive activites of the de-
fendant. The line A - B indicates the rate of growth actually
achieved by plaintiff in the relevant market up to the present
time (Ta). The vertical distance from the horizontal axis to any
point on the line A - B represents the market share that the plain-
tiff achieved in the relevant market in a particular instance.
67. Because of these features, the foregone profits model works to
advance the goals of the antitrust laws, since its application makes it
harder for antitrust offenders to go undetected and unpunished during
periods of economic decline.
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FIGURE II
FOREGONE PROFITS MODEL, ENTRY CASE
In the situation where the plaintiff is actually foreclosed
from entering the market, its actual market share of zero percent
is represented by the horizontal axis T1 - T3. The line E - F de-
notes the increasing rate of market share that would have resulted
the increasing rate of market share that would have resulted
except for the predatory conduct by the defendant until time
period T2. After T2, market shares are assumed to stabilize at a
constant level. The line F - D indicates the estimated market
share level that would have been sustained by the plaintiff after
the growth period and until the present time. Thus, the distance
from F to the horizontal axis represents the market share that
reasonably could have been obtained by the plaintiff had it had
full legal access to the market in question. Where the plaintiff
was able to penetrate the market to some extent, the percentage
of market sales represented by the area bounded by ABDFE
represents the market share foregone by plaintiff over time. Esti-
mation of foregone profits is made by multiplying the ordinary
profit level of the plaintiff times sales and the foregone market
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percentages represented by ABDFE. 68 In the case of a plaintiff
foreclosed entirely from entry into the market, foregone market
share is represented by the area bounded by T1 T3 DFE, and fore-
gone profits are estimated by multiplying the ordinary profit
level times sales and the foregone market percentages repre-
sented by T1 T3 DFE.6 9
As might be expected, the calculation of lost profits in the
situations outlined in Figure II is somewhat more speculative
than that presented in Figure I. This is because actual data
already exist for all points appearing in Figure I except G - D
while the only existing data in Figure II relate to the position
and slope of the line A - B. This does not mean, however, that a
plaintiff is foreclosed from using the foregone profit theory in
Figure II cases. The plaintiff simply must find other ways to
determine the position of the critical points in Figure II. This
can be accomplished by the use of two yardstick approaches.
First, using its own business as a base, the plaintiff can compare
its performance in the relevant market where its actual perform-
ance in related markets was unaffected by the defendant's anti-
competitive practices. This was the approach adopted in Zenith.
70
Second, the plaintiff can use as a comparison another firm in
the same relevant market, unaffected by the defendant's prac-
tices, to determine what market share it could reasonably have
been expected to reach and maintain.
71
In all cases, the plaintiff's damage calculations using the
foregone profits model can be represented by the following
formula:
n
TFP = E St x Pt x (M - R)
t=l
where
TFP = total foregone profits
St = total market size ($) in period t
Pt = profit potential (% of sales) in period t
Mt = potential market share as percent of total market in
period t
R, = actual market share as percent of total market in period t
n = number of time periods (years, months) for which fore-
gone profits are being estimated 72
68. This corresponds to the foregone market share represented by
the triangle GBD in Figure 1. See discussion at pp. 1244-45 supra.
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 41-46 supra.
71. Although this approach has yet to be applied by a court, its
acceptance is suggested by general acceptance of the yardstick method.
72. .Assume a pre-trial impact period of 2 years (n=2) and the
following market conditions:
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C. FUTURE DISCOUNTED PROFITS MODEL
The most recent Supreme Court statements on the recovery
of future damages is contained in the second opinion of the Court
in the Zenith case.73 In that opinion, the Court recognized that
anticompetitive activities will continue to adversely affect the
market environment for the injured competitor for a period of
time after the illegal acts have been terminated:
[E]ach separate cause of action that so accrues entitles the
plaintiff to recover not only those damages which he has suf-
fered at the rate of accrual, but also those which he will suffer
in the future from the particular invasion, including what he
has suffered during and will predictably suffer after trial ....
Thus if a plaintiff feels the adverse impact of an antitrust con-
spiracy on a particular date, the cause of action immediately
accrues to him to recover all damages incurred by that date
and all provable damages that will flow in the future from the
acts of the conspirators on that date.7 4
The operative language in the above passage is "all provable
damages." As noted earlier,75 the Supreme Court indicated in
the same opinion that the plaintiff may not recover future dam-
ages if their occurrence is speculative or if their amount and
nature are unprovable. Thus, the question of future damages in
the present case hinges on what is "provable." With this in
mind, the future discounted profits model was developed as the
next logical step in the proof of damages after the foregone
profits model.
Reference is now made to Figure III where an additional
segment, BDC, has been added to a combined version of Figures
I and I. T4 represents the present point in time, while T5 repre-
sents the date in the future when the impact of the violation
on the plaintiff will terminate. Thus, T4 to T5 represents the
length of time that would be required for the plaintiff to regain
its rightful share of the relevant market. In accordance with
the yardstick approach,7 6 the rate of growth indicated by B-C
S, = $1,000,000 S 2  = $1,200,000
P, = 20% (.20) P 2  = 20% (.20)
M1 = 10% (.10) M 2  = 10% (.10)
Ri = 5% (.05) R2 = 8% (.08)
The formula result is
TFP1  = $10,000
TFP2  = $ 4,800
TF~t~t.1= $14,800
73. 401U.S.321 (1971).
74. Id. at 338-39.
75. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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should be similar to the market entry rate E-F. Therefore,
B - C is parallel to E - F. The percentage of sales represented by
the area bounded by BCD represents the market share that will
be foregone in the future by the plaintiff. Calculation of future
lost profits is made by multiplying the lost market share times
projected market sales and the plaintiff's projected profit rate.
These values are in turn discounted on a yearly basis to arrive
at the present value of future damages.
FIGURE III
CONSOLIDATED FOREGONE PROFITS MODELS (FIGuRS I & II)
AND FUTURE DIscouNTED PROFITS MODEL
T, T2  T3  Time T4  T5
The primary advantage to this theory for proving lost future
profits is that it requires the use of only three variables, each
of which is determinable with reasonable certainty. The first
variable is the time (T4 to T5) it will take the plaintiff to gain or
regain its rightful share of the relevant market following cessa-
tion of the defendant's illegal practices. In some cases, the rate
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of growth of market share can be determined by reference to the
plaintiff's actual experience from T1 to T2 , assuming it entered
the relevant market prior to the defendant's illegal conduct. In
other cases, the yardstick approach can be used to determine the
proper rate of growth of the plaintiff's market share. Once the
rate of growth is known for each market, the calculation of the
time period represented by T4 to T5 is simple.
The second variable is the plaintiff's projected rate of profit.
This is determinable by reference to the plaintiff's historical profit
rates in the relevant market and in related markets. If the plain-
tiff is denied entry into the market, profits earned by compar-
able yardstick firms may be used.
The final variable is the most uncertain of the three, but it
is still ascertainable. This factor is the size of the relevant mar-
ket in terms of total sales for each year from T4 to Tr and is
determinable by two interconnected methods. One involves the
use of a mathematical model of the market. First, the existing
sales data for the market are plotted on a graph over time. From
such a plot an equation can be fitted to the data by the use of
regression analysis. 7 To arrive at the future size of the market,
reference is made to the equation for the location of future points
on the graph. Depending on the "fit" of the equation to the data,
this method can produce an accurate picture of the size of the
market at a given point in the future. This procedure assumes
that the past is the best guide to the future. The second method
involves the use of an expert witness, who is familiar with the
industry in question, to estimate the future size of a given mar-
ket. A procedure combining the mathematical objectivity of the
first method with an expert opinion generally produces the most
reliable. results.
The generalized future discounted profits model can be
represented by the following formula:
77. Regression analysis is a statistical procedure whereby an equa-
tion is fitted to an observed set of data by minimizing the sum of the
deviations from a line described by the equation.
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In S,,xPt, x ((M.-R)- x)) ]TFDP = Y_
t' =n+l (1- +)
where
TFDP = total present value of future discounted profits
m = future time period when damages become zero
t' = future time periods beyond n
n = last time period for which foregone profits were cal-
culated
S,, = future projected market size ($) in period t'
P, = future profit potential (% of sales) in period t'
M. = potential plaintiff's share of St,
1 , = plaintiff's market share of geographic market at end
of foregone profit period
M. - R.
(m -n)
S = (t'- n)
r = discount rate78
D. CONCLUSION
The geometric and algebraic models presented here summar-
ize the existing "before and after," "yardstick," and "market
share" models used in assessing antitrust damages currently. But
these models also suggest extensions of exciting usage to include
market entry and firm growth and provide a computational
framework that consolidates and highlights the central economic
and legal determinations needed. These include: (1) what is
the "rightful share" of a market by an injured competitor (po-
tential or real); (2) what patterns of entry and growth are appro-
priate given variations in product and market conditions; and
(3) what profit measure and data should be employed in comput-
ing the damages incurred.
The evolution of methods for measuring antitrust damages
has been slow, but it has generally kept pace with the demands
78. Assume that the market returns to "normal" two years fol-
lowing judgment favorable to the plaintiff (u=2) and the following
market conditions:
m = 4 M. = 10% (.10)
ti = 3 R% = 8% (.08)
n = 2 c = .01
S8 = $1,500,000 r = 6% (.06)
P3, = 20% (.20)
The formula result is
TFPD = $2,830.19
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of the courts. The foregone profits and future discounted profits
models presented here build on the existing theories and are
presented as a further step in the evolutionary process. They
work to better effectuate the goal outlined by the Court in Story
Parchment: "The constant tendency of the courts is to find some
way in which damages can be awarded where a wrong has been
done."79
79. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 565 (1931).
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